Article 2 TEU Values and Legal Force: General Principles of EU Law Essay Sample

Last Modified: 16th Nov 2026

For information and reference only – not to be submitted as your own work. This is a model-answer extract prepared by our editorial team to show how an OSCOLA-referenced General Principles of EU Law essay can be structured. It is not a complete 2,000-word submission.

The extract answers Option 2 of the General Principles of EU Law essay question: what determines whether Article 2 TEU values have practical legal force, tested against the rule of law and respect for human rights and equality.

Item Detail
Module / level General Principles of EU Law, Level 6 LLB (UK)
Question chosen Option 2 – Article 2 TEU values and their practical legal force
Values assessed Rule of law; respect for human rights, including equality
Referencing OSCOLA, numbered footnote markers [1], [2] with a numbered list below
Extract coverage Thesis, framework, rule of law, rights and equality, seminar reflection, conclusion

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Planning Table

Section Purpose Indicative words
Introduction and thesis State what turns a value into a legal rule 200
What determines legal force Treaty text, justiciability, a hook in national or Union law, enforcement route 300
Value 1: rule of law Article 19(1) TEU, Article 7 TEU, conditionality 600
Value 2: human rights and equality General principles, Charter, limits of the Union’s reach 500
Seminar reflection How an activity tested the argument 150
Conclusion Answer the question directly 250

Model Answer Extract

Introduction and Thesis (extract)

Article 2 TEU declares that the Union is founded on respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and human rights. Read alone, the provision looks aspirational. This essay argues that a value acquires practical legal force only when three conditions are met: the Court of Justice can attach the value to a justiciable provision, there is a procedural route by which someone can bring it before a court, and a remedy exists that a Member State cannot easily ignore. Judged by that test, the rule of law has gained force faster than most other values, while equality and rights protection remain tied to the scope of Union law.

What Determines Legal Force (extract)

The political mechanism in Article 7 TEU, which allows the Council to determine a clear risk of, or a serious and persistent breach of, Article 2 values, requires unanimity for the second step and has not produced sanctions. If Article 7 were the only route, Article 2 would have little practical effect. The more significant development is judicial. In Repubblika the Court treated Article 2 as more than a statement of policy guidelines, holding that it contains values that are given concrete expression in binding principles, and it derived from Article 49 TEU a requirement that a Member State not reduce the protection of the rule of law in its national legal order.[1] That reasoning matters because it converts a political declaration into a standard of review.

The determinants can be summarised as follows.

Determinant Effect on legal force Example
Concrete treaty hook Allows the value to be applied through a specific obligation Article 19(1) TEU for judicial independence
Link to Union law Triggers jurisdiction, so the value can be invoked against a Member State Charter applies only when Member States implement Union law
Enforcement route Infringement action or preliminary reference makes the value enforceable Commission v Poland; LM
Financial leverage Gives a remedy that bites without treaty amendment Conditionality Regulation 2020/2092

Value One: The Rule of Law (extract)

The Court built its case law on Article 19(1) TEU, which requires Member States to provide remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal protection in fields covered by Union law. In Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, a challenge to temporary salary reductions for Portuguese judges, the Court held that national courts that may rule on the application or interpretation of Union law must meet the requirement of independence, and that Article 19(1) applies irrespective of whether a Member State is implementing Union law in the Charter sense.[2] That second point is the doctrinal turning point: the value is anchored in the structure of the Treaties rather than in the Charter’s narrower scope clause.

The Commission relied on the same reasoning in Commission v Poland (Independence of the Supreme Court), where lowering the retirement age of Supreme Court judges and granting the President discretion to extend their service breached Article 19(1) TEU.[3] The preliminary reference route produced a more cautious result in LM, which accepted that surrender under a European arrest warrant could be refused where there was a real risk of a breach of the right to a fair trial, but required a two-step assessment, first of systemic deficiencies and then of the individual’s position.[4] The two-step test shows a limit: the value gains force, but the Court filters it through mutual trust.

The conditionality mechanism extended the argument to money. In the cases brought by Hungary and Poland, the Court rejected challenges to Regulation 2020/2092, holding that the Union may make budget protection depend on respect for Article 2 values where breaches affect, or risk affecting, the sound financial management of the Union budget.[5] A critic would note the Regulation’s nexus requirement. The Court itself stressed that the mechanism is aimed at budgetary risk, not at general policing of values. Scheppele, Kochenov and Grabowska-Moroz argue that the Commission has underused infringement proceedings that could treat Article 2 breaches as systemic violations of enforceable law.[6] Pech and Scheppele describe the wider pattern of backsliding as one that political processes alone have failed to arrest.[7] Both pieces support the thesis that justiciability, rather than text, drives practical force.

Value Two: Human Rights and Equality (extract)

Rights entered Union law through the Court, not the founding Treaties. After the Court insisted on the supremacy and uniform effect of Union law in Costa v ENEL, it faced the risk that national constitutional courts would resist.[8] In Internationale Handelsgesellschaft the Court rejected review of Union measures against national constitutional rights but, in Stauder and Nold, recognised fundamental rights as part of the general principles of Union law, inspired by constitutional traditions common to the Member States.[9] The functions are interpretative, gap-filling and a ground of review.

Equality shows both the strength and the weakness of this route. In Mangold the Court treated non-discrimination on grounds of age as a general principle and disapplied national legislation inconsistent with it, even though the directive’s transposition period had not expired.[10] The decision gave a value direct effect against national law, but it was criticised for legal certainty. Rights also constrain Union action: in Kadi the Court annulled a Regulation implementing UN Security Council sanctions because the applicants’ rights of defence and effective judicial protection had not been respected.[11] The Court described respect for human rights as a condition of the lawfulness of Union acts, which indicates that Article 2 values have force against the Union as well as Member States.

The limit is jurisdictional. Where a Member State acts outside Union law, the Charter is not engaged, and Article 2 on its own has so far supplied no free-standing basis for review. Von Bogdandy and colleagues proposed a “reverse Solange” doctrine to fill the gap by protecting the essence of rights where systemic failure occurs in a Member State.[12] The Court has not adopted that doctrine in terms, though Article 19(1) TEU, as applied to judicial independence, does something comparable for one value.

Seminar Reflection (extract)

Illustrative placeholder: in a seminar exercise comparing the reasoning in Mangold with a domestic discrimination case, the group was asked whether a court should disapply legislation that conflicts with an unwritten principle. Applying that test to the argument above, the discussion exposed a weakness in the draft position, which had treated legal certainty and equality as equally weighty. The reflection led to the narrower claim that equality has force only where a Union-law link exists, which the final answer now states expressly. Students must replace this paragraph with a genuine account of their own seminar activity.

Conclusion (extract)

Article 2 TEU values have practical force to the extent that the Court can attach them to a justiciable provision and a Member State cannot avoid the remedy. The rule of law now meets that test through Article 19(1) TEU and conditionality; equality and rights meet it only inside the scope of Union law. Article 2 is therefore neither a dead letter nor a free-standing source of rights, and the picture will change only if enforcement is pursued more consistently.

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References

  1. Case C-896/19 Repubblika v Il-Prim Ministru EU:C:2021:311.
  2. Case C-64/16 Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses v Tribunal de Contas EU:C:2018:117.
  3. Case C-619/18 Commission v Poland (Independence of the Supreme Court) EU:C:2019:531.
  4. Case C-216/18 PPU Minister for Justice and Equality v LM EU:C:2018:586.
  5. Case C-156/21 Hungary v European Parliament and Council EU:C:2022:97; Case C-157/21 Poland v European Parliament and Council EU:C:2022:98; Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget [2020] OJ L433I/1.
  6. Kim Lane Scheppele, Dimitry Kochenov and Barbara Grabowska-Moroz, ‘EU Values Are Law, after All: Enforcing EU Values through Systemic Infringement Actions by the European Commission and the Member States of the European Union’ (2020) 39 Yearbook of European Law 3.
  7. Laurent Pech and Kim Lane Scheppele, ‘Illiberalism Within: Rule of Law Backsliding in the EU’ (2017) 19 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 3.
  8. Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL EU:C:1964:66.
  9. Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft EU:C:1970:114; Case 29/69 Stauder v City of Ulm EU:C:1969:57; Case 4/73 Nold v Commission EU:C:1974:51.
  10. Case C-144/04 Mangold v Helm EU:C:2005:709.
  11. Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission EU:C:2008:461.
  12. Armin von Bogdandy and others, ‘Reverse Solange – Protecting the Essence of Fundamental Rights against EU Member States’ (2012) 49 Common Market Law Review 489.
My Assignment Help Malaysia Editorial Team

Prepared by

My Assignment Help Malaysia Editorial Team

This model answer was prepared by our editorial team in response to a real assignment brief we received. It shows one way to approach the task and is meant as a study guide, not for submission.

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